Role of Parental Wealth & Income in Financing Children's College Attendance & Its Consequences

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
Acknowledgments

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Trends 1

Figure 1: Trend in Income Inequality, 1965-2014

(a) Real Mean Household Income by Quintile & Top 5%



Trends 2


Figure 2: Trends in Home Prices and Homeownership, 1975-2016




Sources: St. Louis Fed

Trends 3

Figure 3: Trends in Costs of College and Student Debt



(b) Households with Outstanding Student Debt by $\ensuremath{\mathsf{Age}}$



scheduled repayment period.

Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of Survey of Consumer Finances data

Sources: The College Board, Annual Survey of Colleges; Pew Research Center, "Record 1-in-5 Households Now Owe Student Loan Debt," 2012.

Research Questions

- What is the influence of parental wealth & income on whether their children attend college & whether parents help finance it?
- What consequences do these college attendance & financing decisions have on subsequent:
 - levels of indebtedness of parents & their children?
 - consumption & well-being of parents & children?
- Did these effects differ over time, i.e., before & after Great Recession?
 - We will have less to say about this today. Although our tentative answer is: "we don't think so."

Related Literatures 1

- Effects of parental income & wealth, particularly housing wealth, on:
 - college attendance (Lovenheim, 2011).
 - "quality" of college attended (Lovenheim and Reynolds, 2013; Cooper and Luengo-Prado, 2015).
 - child's income in adulthood (Cooper and Luengo-Prado, 2015).
- College attendance & financing as parental investments in & transfers to children:
 - Becker and Tomes (1979) model of parental altruism & investment in children
 - Importance of credit constraints & "insufficient altruism" (Behrman et al., 1995; Cameron and Heckman, 1998, 2001; Keane and Wolpin, 2001; Cameron and Taber, 2004; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011, 2016)
 - Possibility of commitment problems in intergenerational family interactions (Brown et al., 2012).

Related Literatures 2

- Effects of wealth on consumption & well-being of households:
 - Effects of changes in wealth on consumption (Skinner, 1996; Case et al., 2005; Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Carroll et al., 2011; Browning et al., 2013; Paiella and Pistaferri, ming).
 - Effects of changes in wealth on savings (Juster et al., 2006).
 - Work focuses on separating effects of anticipated vs. unanticipated changes in wealth, especially housing.
 - In our case: Does the way children's college education is financed e.g., by parents with debt or by students with debt – have lasting effects on each generation's well-being?
- Effects of parental resources on home-leaving of younger adults (Manacorda and Moretti, 2006; Kaplan, 2012; Wiemers, 2014).

Data

PSID Annual Survey

- Parents' family structure, income, education, etc.
- Parents' home ownership, home value & mortgage info, including home equity loans.
- Child's home-leaving status
- Parents' & adult child's consumption (food)

PSID Wealth Module

- Parents' & adult child's non-mortgage debt (credit cards, student loans, medical debt, etc.)
- 2013 PSID Roster and Transfers Modules (Schoeni et al., 2015)
 - Parent reports educational attainment of each adult child
 - Long-term transfers for post-secondary education for each adult child
- All monetary variables are expressed as 10K of 2013\$.

Sample

- In 2013 Roster and Transfers Module, PSID Head/Wives reported on all of their adult children.
- We "look back" in PSID waves to find these children when they were age
 18
 - link in financial & family characteristics of their biological or adopted father & mother
- Then "look forward" in PSID waves for when child was age 25 and
 - link in financial characteristics, including debt, of parents & child

Sample

Sample Sizes

| | Full | Homeowners |
|----------------------------|-------------|------------|
| | Sample | Only |
| All Parent-Child Pairs | 7,857 | 4,948 |
| Parents: | | |
| with Indebtedness Data | 6,137 | 4,040 |
| with Consumption Data | 5,688 | 3,689 |
| Children who are hshld. he | eads by ago | e 25: |
| with Indebtedness Data | 3,325 | 2,254 |
| with Consumption Data | 3,066 | 2,061 |
| | | |

- In descriptive stats below, we distinguish three periods:
 - 1975 1995 (*Per*0) pre-Housing Run-up/Boom
 - 1996 2007 (*Per1*) **Housing Boom**
 - 2008 2013 (Per2) Great Recession & aftermath

College Attendance & Parental Transfers

- Categories for Child's College Attendance & Parents' financial help choices:
 - EduFin0: Child does not attend
 - EduFin1: Child attends, parents do not make transfer
 - EduFin2: Child attends, parents make a transfer
- Conditional on EduFin2 = 1, let CollTrans denote amount of financial help or transfer parent i provided to child j in support of attending college.
 - CollTrans and all other dollar denominated variables are in 10K of 2013\$.

Table 1: Distributions of Child's College Attendance & Parents' Financing when Child Age 18^{*}

| | Share of | | | | Amt Transfer, | |
|--------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|--|
| When Child Age 18: | Parents | EduFin0 | EduFin1 | EduFin2 | EduFin2 = 1 | |
| | | All Yea | rs | | | |
| All Parents | 1.00 | 0.51 | 0.31 | 0.19 | \$2.29 | |
| Non-Homeowners | 0.37 | 0.68 | 0.25 | 0.07 | \$0.91 | |
| Homeowners | 0.63 | 0.41 | 0.34 | 0.25 | \$2.52 | |
| | | 1975-19 | 95 | | | |
| All Parents | 1.00 | 0.47 | 0.39 | 0.14 | \$1.41 | |
| Non-Homeowners | 0.32 | 0.63 | 0.3 | 0.06 | \$0.84 | |
| Homeowners | 0.68 | 0.39 | 0.43 | 0.18 | \$1.51 | |
| | | 1996-20 | 07 | | | |
| All Parents | 1.00 | 0.49 | 0.32 | 0.19 | \$2.91 | |
| Non-Homeowners | 0.36 | 0.67 | 0.27 | 0.06 | \$0.97 | |
| Homeowners | 0.64 | 0.39 | 0.34 | 0.27 | \$3.15 | |
| 2008-2013 | | | | | | |
| All Parents | 1.00 | 0.58 | 0.20 | 0.22 | \$1.92 | |
| Non-Homeowners | 0.45 | 0.73 | 0.18 | 0.09 | \$0.90 | |
| Homeowners | 0.55 | 0.46 | 0.21 | 0.33 | \$2.16 | |

 $^{^{\}ast}$ All tabulations are weighted, using PSID family weights. Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$.

Parental Home Market Value, Home Equity & Income

Among parents who are homeowners, let:

- $H_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ denote parents' estimate of *market value of home* in year child j is 18, i.e., year $t_{18,j}$.
- MortBal_{imt18,j} denote remaining balances on home mortgages & equity loans.
- Parents' home equity is

$$HEquity_{imt_{18,j}} = H_{imt_{18,j}} - MortBal_{imt_{18,j}}. \tag{1}$$

• Indicator of parent having *positive home equity* in year $t_{18,j}$, i.e., can *use home as collateral for loan*:

$$I_{imt_{18,j}}^{L} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } HEquity_{imt_{18,j}} \ge 0, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
 (2)

And for all parents, let:

• $Y_{imt_{18,j}}$ denotes parents' *household income* in year child j is 18, $(t_{18,j})$.

Table 2: Distributions of Child's College Attendance & Parents' Financing, by Parents' Home Equity when Child Age 18, Among Homeowners*

| | Share of | | | | Amt Transfer, |
|-------------------------|----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------------|
| When Child Age 18: | Parents | EduFin0 | EduFin1 | EduFin2 | EduFin2 = 1 |
| | | All Years | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.05 | 0.53 | 0.31 | 0.16 | \$1.26 |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.95 | 0.4 | 0.34 | 0.26 | \$2.56 |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 0.53 | 0.34 | 0.13 | \$1.10 |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 0.39 | 0.34 | 0.27 | \$2.02 |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 0.19 | 0.36 | 0.45 | \$3.73 |
| | | 1975-199 | 5 | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.02 | 0.61 | 0.32 | 0.07 | \$3.10 |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.98 | 0.39 | 0.43 | 0.18 | \$1.50 |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.33 | 0.48 | 0.43 | 0.08 | \$0.89 |
| Middle 3rd | 0.33 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.19 | \$1.09 |
| Top 3rd | 0.33 | 0.24 | 0.46 | 0.29 | \$2.02 |
| | | 1996-200 | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.04 | 0.49 | 0.37 | 0.14 | \$1.42 |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.96 | 0.39 | 0.34 | 0.27 | \$3.20 |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 0.53 | 0.35 | 0.12 | \$1.41 |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.31 | \$2.60 |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 0.15 | 0.34 | 0.52 | \$4.51 |
| 100 314 | 0.52 | 2008-201 | | 0.52 | Ψ1.31 |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.11 | 0.54 | 0.26 | 0.20 | \$1.01 |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.11 | 0.45 | 0.20 | 0.20 | \$2.24 |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.89 | 0.43 | 0.20 | 0.33 | \$0.79 |
| | | | | | \$1.63 |
| Middle 3rd | 0.30 | 0.44 | 0.22 | 0.34 | |
| Top 3rd | 0.30 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.62 | \$3.79 |

^{*} All tabulations are weighted, using PSID family weights. Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$

| | CI C | | | | A . T (| | |
|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|--|--|
| | Share of | | | | Amt Transfer, | | |
| When Child Age 18: | Parents | EduFin0 | EduFin1 | EduFin2 | EduFin2 = 1 | | |
| | | All Yea | | | | | |
| Bottom Quintile | 0.15 | 0.77 | 0.21 | 0.03 | \$0.94 | | |
| Bottom Middle | 0.16 | 0.68 | 0.27 | 0.06 | \$0.72 | | |
| Middle Quintile | 0.19 | 0.60 | 0.29 | 0.11 | \$0.80 | | |
| Top Middle | 0.24 | 0.45 | 0.35 | 0.20 | \$1.24 | | |
| Top Quintile | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.36 | 0.40 | \$3.26 | | |
| | | 1975-19 | 95 | | | | |
| Bottom Quintile | 0.14 | 0.74 | 0.24 | 0.02 | \$0.50 | | |
| Bottom Middle | 0.12 | 0.66 | 0.32 | 0.02 | \$1.11 | | |
| Middle Quintile | 0.17 | 0.54 | 0.38 | 0.08 | \$0.66 | | |
| Top Middle | 0.26 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.14 | \$0.75 | | |
| Top Quintile | 0.31 | 0.27 | 0.45 | 0.28 | \$1.84 | | |
| | | 1996-20 | 07 | | | | |
| Bottom Quintile | 0.15 | 0.76 | 0.22 | 0.02 | \$0.93 | | |
| Bottom Middle | 0.17 | 0.67 | 0.28 | 0.04 | \$0.77 | | |
| Middle Quintile | 0.19 | 0.59 | 0.31 | 0.10 | \$0.99 | | |
| Top Middle | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0.35 | 0.21 | \$1.61 | | |
| Top Quintile | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.37 | 0.44 | \$4.04 | | |
| ., ., | 2008-2013 | | | | | | |
| Bottom Quintile | 0.16 | 0.79 | 0.16 | 0.05 | \$1.11 | | |
| Bottom Middle | 0.20 | 0.70 | 0.2 | 0.01 | \$0.62 | | |
| Middle Quintile | 0.21 | 0.66 | 0.19 | 0.15 | \$0.65 | | |
| Top Middle | 0.22 | 0.53 | 0.22 | 0.25 | \$0.93 | | |
| Top Quintile | 0.21 | 0.29 | 0.19 | 0.52 | \$3.06 | | |
| | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 40.00 | | |

 $^{^{*}}$ All tabulations are weighted, using PSID family weights. Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013 $^{\$}$

Table 4: Distributions of Parents' Home Value & Household Income by their Home Equity & Household Income when Child Age 18*

| | Share of | | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------|------------------|------------------|--|--|--|--|
| When Child Age 18: | Parents | $H_{imt_{18,j}}$ | $Y_{imt_{18,j}}$ | | | | |
| Α | II Years | | | | | | |
| All Parents | 1.00 | 5.00 | 6.18 | | | | |
| Non-Homeowners | 0.37 | | 3.41 | | | | |
| Homeowners | 0.63 | 7.93 | 7.82 | | | | |
| 19 | 75-1995 | | | | | | |
| All Parents | 1.00 | 3.68 | 4.41 | | | | |
| Non-Homeowners | 0.32 | | 2.53 | | | | |
| Homeowners | 0.68 | 5.39 | 5.28 | | | | |
| 19 | 96-2007 | | | | | | |
| All Parents | 1.00 | 5.45 | 6.76 | | | | |
| Non-Homeowners | 0.36 | 0.01 | 3.43 | | | | |
| Homeowners | 0.64 | 8.48 | 8.62 | | | | |
| 2008-2013 | | | | | | | |
| All Parents | 1.00 | 5.66 | 7.14 | | | | |
| Non-Homeowners | 0.45 | | 4.09 | | | | |
| Homeowners | 0.55 | 10.37 | 9.68 | | | | |

^{*} All tabulations are weighted, using PSID family weights. Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$.

Market Variation in Housing Values & Parental Income

- We use market-level measures of housing values to develop "more exogenous" measure of change (or innovations) in parental housing wealth.
- Let $HPI_{mt_{18,j}}$ denote FHFA *housing price index* for MSA or rest-of-state market m in year $t_{18,j}$.
- Then

$$\Delta HPI_{mt_{18,j}} \equiv \frac{HPI_{mt_{18,j}} - HPI_{mt_{18,j}-4}}{HPI_{mt_{18,j}}}$$
(3)

- We also use market-level measures of average wages for "more exogenous" measure of change (or innovations) in parental income.
- Let W_{mt18,j} denote annual average wages for count m from QCEW data series.
- Then


$$\Delta W_{mt_{18,j}} \equiv \frac{W_{mt_{18,j}} - W_{mt_{18,j}-4}}{W_{mt_{18,j}}} \tag{4}$$

Table 5: Distributions of Local Changes in Housing Prices & Wages and L&R Measures of Changes in Home Equity & Income when Child Age 18, among Homeowner Parents*

| | Share of | | "L&R" Measure: | | "L&R" Measure: | | | |
|-------------------------|----------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--|--|--|
| When Child Age 18: | Parents | $\Delta HPI_{mt_{18,j}}$ | $\Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ | $\Delta W_{mt_{18,j}}$ | $\Delta Y_{imt_{18,j}}$ | | | |
| | | | ears | | • | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.05 | -3% | -1.35 | 11% | 0.55 | | | |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.95 | 14% | 2.24 | 14% | 0.82 | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 12% | 0.83 | 13% | 0.57 | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 13% | 1.72 | 13% | 0.75 | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 18% | 5.34 | 15% | 1.34 | | | |
| 1975-1995 | | | | | | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.02 | 6% | 0.12 | 14% | 0.45 | | | |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.98 | 16% | 1.57 | 17% | 0.73 | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.33 | 15% | 0.61 | 16% | 0.50 | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.33 | 14% | 1.08 | 16% | 0.61 | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.33 | 21% | 3.34 | 19% | 1.15 | | | |
| | | 1996 | -2007 | | | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.04 | 17% | 1.50 | 13% | 0.61 | | | |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.96 | 18% | 3.62 | 13% | 0.89 | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 17% | 1.43 | 13% | 0.62 | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 19% | 3.22 | 12% | 0.86 | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 21% | 8.46 | 13% | 1.47 | | | |
| | | 2008- | -2013 | | | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.11 | -23% | -4.18 | 9% | 0.53 | | | |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.89 | -2% | -0.05 | 10% | 0.81 | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.30 | -2% | -0.32 | 10% | 0.56 | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.30 | -5% | -0.81 | 10% | 0.72 | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.30 | 3% | 1.62 | 11% | 1.44 | | | |

 $^{^{*}}$ All tabulations are weighted, using PSID family weights. Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$.

Figure 4: Trends in HPI in Census Regions, 1980-2015



College & Financing Choices

Let $U_{kijm,18}$ denote the utility/payoff to choice $EduFink_{ij,18}$, k=0,1,2 for jth child of parent i when child is age 18:

$$U_{kijm,18} = \lambda_{k0} + \lambda_{k1} \Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} + \lambda_{k2} \Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}} + \lambda_{k5} X_{ij} + \lambda_{k6} Z_{mt_{18,j}} + \phi_{t_{18,j}} + \delta_{ijm} + \zeta_{kij,18}.$$
(5)

where

- $\Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ is change in market value of parents' home in $t_{18,j}$;
- $\Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ is innovation in parent income in $t_{18,j}$;
- X_{ij} are demographic characteristics of parents & their j^{th} child;
- $Z_{mt_{18,j}}$ time-varying characteristics of location m in $t_{18,j}$;
- $\phi_{t_{18,i}}$ & δ_{ijm} year & state-of-residence effects
- $\zeta_{kij,18}$ choice-specific unobservables.

Only estimated over parents who were/are homeowners in $t_{18,j}$ (True of all analyses presented today.)

College & Financing Choices

Alternative specification of payoff specification takes account of differential impacts of $\Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ & $\Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ by whether parents have **positive equity**:

$$U_{kij,18} = \lambda_{k0}^{*} + \lambda_{k1}^{*} \Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot I_{imt_{18,j}}^{L} + \lambda_{k2}^{*} \Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot I_{imt_{18,j}}^{L} + \lambda_{k3}^{*} [1 - I_{imt_{18,j}}^{L}] + \lambda_{k4}^{*} \Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot [1 - I_{imt_{18,j}}^{L}] + \lambda_{k5}^{*} \Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot [1 - I_{imt_{18,j}}^{L}] + \lambda_{k6}^{*} X_{ij} + \lambda_{k7}^{*} Z_{mt_{18,j}} + \phi_{t_{18,j}}^{*} + \phi_{t_{18,j}}^{*} + \zeta_{kij,18}.$$
(6)

where

- $I_{imt_{18,j}}^{L}$ is indicator of **positive equity**.
- Estimate as multinomial logit, with choice k = 0 be base category.

Dealing with Endogeneity of $\Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ and $\Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}}$

- **Key issue:** Potential *endogeneity* of both $\Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ & $\Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ in estimation parameters in (5) & (6).
- We adapt strategy used by Lovenheim and Reynolds (2013)
- Define innovation in parental housing wealth as:

$$\Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} \equiv H_{imt_{18,j}} \cdot \Delta HPI_{mt_{18,j}} \tag{7}$$

• Similarly, define innovation in parent *i*s household income as:

$$\Delta Y_{imt_{18,j}} \equiv Y_{imt_{18,j}} \cdot \Delta W_{mt_{18,j}} \tag{8}$$

Table 6: Distributions of Local Changes in Housing Prices & Wages and L&R Measures of Changes in Home Equity & Income when Child Age 18, among Homeowner Parents*

| | Share of | | "L&R" Measure: | | "L&R" Measure: | | | |
|-------------------------|----------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--|--|--|
| When Child Age 18: | Parents | $\Delta HPI_{mt_{18.i}}$ | $\Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ | $\Delta W_{mt_{18./}}$ | $\Delta Y_{imt_{18,j}}$ | | | |
| All Years | | | | | | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.05 | -3% | -1.35 | 11% | 0.55 | | | |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.95 | 14% | 2.24 | 14% | 0.82 | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 12% | 0.83 | 13% | 0.57 | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 13% | 1.72 | 13% | 0.75 | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 18% | 5.34 | 15% | 1.34 | | | |
| | | 1975 | -1995 | | | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.02 | 6% | 0.12 | 14% | 0.45 | | | |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.98 | 16% | 1.57 | 17% | 0.73 | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.33 | 15% | 0.61 | 16% | 0.50 | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.33 | 14% | 1.08 | 16% | 0.61 | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.33 | 21% | 3.34 | 19% | 1.15 | | | |
| | | 1996 | -2007 | | | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.04 | 17% | 1.50 | 13% | 0.61 | | | |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.96 | 18% | 3.62 | 13% | 0.89 | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 17% | 1.43 | 13% | 0.62 | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 19% | 3.22 | 12% | 0.86 | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 21% | 8.46 | 13% | 1.47 | | | |
| 2008-2013 | | | | | | | | |
| Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.11 | -23% | -4.18 | 9% | 0.53 | | | |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.89 | -2% | -0.05 | 10% | 0.81 | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.30 | -2% | -0.32 | 10% | 0.56 | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.30 | -5% | -0.81 | 10% | 0.72 | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.30 | 3% | 1.62 | 11% | 1.44 | | | |

 $^{^{*}}$ All tabulations are weighted, using PSID family weights. Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$.

College & Financing Choices

Table 7: Marginal Effects of Changes in Wealth and Income on College and Financing Choices

| | College and Financing Choices Multinomial Logit | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|----------|-----------|------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | EduFin0 | EduFin1 | EduFin2 | EduFin0 | EduFin1 | EduFin2 | EduFin2 | EduFin2 |
| Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| $\Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ | -0.0021 | 5.31e-06 | 0.0021* | | | | 0.0560** | |
| If Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | | | | -0.0026 | 0.0004 | 0.0022* | | 0.0570** |
| If Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | | | | 0.0070 | -0.0051 | -0.0019 | | 0.0150 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| $\Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}}$ | -0.0612 | 0.0060 | 0.0552*** | | | | 0.4480*** | |
| If Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | | | | -0.0574 | 0.0048 | 0.0527*** | | 0.4480*** |
| If Neg. Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | | | | -0.2200*** | 0.0633 | 0.1570*** | | 0.2710 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Pos. Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | | | | -0.0393 | -0.0009 | 0.0402 | | 0.2000 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| State Fixed Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO |
| MSA Fixed Effects | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year Fixed Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

^{*} Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$.

College & Financing Choices

Findings on college attendance & financing choices

- Exogenous increases in housing wealth increase likelihood of college enrollments, though effects are small.
 - Mechanism operates through parental transfers.
 - A \$10,000 increase in home equity increases the probability of attending college with transfers by 0.22 percentage points, but only for parents with positive home equity.
- Increases in income have larger impact on enrollment & financing decisions than housing wealth.
 - A \$10,000 increase in parental income increases the probability of attending college with transfers by
 - 5.27 percentage points for parents who have positive home equity,
 - 15.7 percentage points for parents who have negative home equity.
- Increases in home equity & income also increase amount of transfers, conditional on giving transfer.

Parents' & Child's Subsequent Indebtedness

 Whether child goes to college & how college is funded may affect indebtedness of either parent or child.

Let

- $Debt_{nht_{24,j}}$ denote **debt** of generation n, n = i for parent & n = j for child of debt type h, measured at time t when child j is age a = 24 (6 years after college decision).
- Types of debt:
 - h = MortBal is mortgage debt of parent, but now when child j is age 24
 - h = OthDebt is other debt of child j when she is age 24, including student loans.

Parents' & Child's Subsequent Consumption

- Using debt to finance children's college education may be efficient, if parents
 or children have access to capital markets &/or can insure against
 unforeseen changes in wealth/income.
- But some parents &/or children may not have adequate access to capital markets &/or realize unforeseen shocks to wealth, e.g., housing bust.
- One way to assess: Examine impact of financing & debt on parents' & child's consumption.

Let

- $Con_{nft_{j,24}}$ denote *consumption* of type f of household n measured at time t when child j is age a=24
- Types of consumption:
 - f = FoodHome is ann. expend. for **food eaten at home**
 - f = FoodOut is ann. expend for **food consumed away from home**.

| | | D- | ent: | Child: | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | ۲ (| | | | | | | | | |
| N. C | Share of | Debt _{i,MortBal,t24,j} | Debt _{i,OthDebt,t24,j} | Debt _{j,OthDebt,t24,j} | | | | | | |
| When Child Age 18: | Parents | (10K of \$) | (10K of \$) | (10K of \$) | | | | | | |
| | All Years | | | | | | | | | |
| Negative Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.03 | 7.81 | 1.09 | 1.01 | | | | | | |
| Positive Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.97 | 6.61 | 1.07 | 1.13 | | | | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 4.63 | 0.92 | 0.99 | | | | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 6.49 | 1.26 | 1.23 | | | | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 9.92 | 1.07 | 1.20 | | | | | | |
| | | 1975-1995 | | | | | | | | |
| Negative Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.02 | 6.57 | 1.13 | 0.37 | | | | | | |
| Positive Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.98 | 3.92 | 0.85 | 0.71 | | | | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.33 | 3.06 | 0.84 | 0.60 | | | | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.33 | 3.60 | 1.04 | 0.64 | | | | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.33 | 5.38 | 0.66 | 0.94 | | | | | | |
| · | | 1996-2007 | | | | | | | | |
| Negative Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.04 | 8.01 | 1.10 | 1.22 | | | | | | |
| Positive Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.96 | 8.02 | 1.18 | 1.39 | | | | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 5.30 | 0.93 | 1.18 | | | | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 8.34 | 1.40 | 1.64 | | | | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 12.81 | 1.37 | 1.41 | | | | | | |
| 10p 0.u | 0.02 | 2008-2013 | 1.01 | 2.12 | | | | | | |
| Negative Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.02 | 10.60 | 0.56 | 0.00 | | | | | | |
| Positive Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.02 | 10.48 | 1.37 | 1.35 | | | | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 6.76 | 1.28 | 1.53 | | | | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 8.67 | 1.48 | 1.56 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 16.67 | 1.40 | 0.51 | | | | | | |

^{*} All tabulations are weighted, using PSID family weights. Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$.

Table 9: Distributions of Parents' & Child's Annual Food Consumption when Child Age 25, by Parents' Housing Wealth when Child Age 18, among Homeowning Parents*

| | | Pare | ent: | Chi | ld: | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| | Share of | Con _{i,FoodHome,tj,24} | Con _{I,FoodOut,tj,24} | Conj, FoodHome, tj, 24 | $Con_{j,FoodOut,t_{j,24}}$ | | | | |
| When Child Age 18: | Parents | (10K of \$) | (10K of \$) | (10K of \$) | (10K of \$) | | | | |
| All Years | | | | | | | | | |
| Negative Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.03 | 0.58 | 0.43 | 0.37 | 0.26 | | | | |
| Positive Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.97 | 0.67 | 0.37 | 0.43 | 0.29 | | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 0.60 | 0.31 | 0.44 | 0.26 | | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 0.61 | 0.32 | 0.39 | 0.27 | | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 0.88 | 0.54 | 0.47 | 0.36 | | | | |
| | | 1975-1 | 995 | | | | | | |
| Negative Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.02 | 0.49 | 0.17 | 0.27 | 0.16 | | | | |
| Positive Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.98 | 0.55 | 0.27 | 0.49 | 0.31 | | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.33 | 0.56 | 0.23 | 0.50 | 0.30 | | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.33 | 0.53 | 0.26 | 0.37 | 0.22 | | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.33 | 0.56 | 0.34 | 0.64 | 0.46 | | | | |
| | | 1996-2 | 007 | | | | | | |
| Negative Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.04 | 0.60 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.29 | | | | |
| Positive Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.96 | 0.71 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.28 | | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 0.61 | 0.35 | 0.41 | 0.24 | | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 0.64 | 0.33 | 0.40 | 0.30 | | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 0.99 | 0.67 | 0.38 | 0.31 | | | | |
| | | 2008-2 | 013 | | | | | | |
| Negative Equity $(I^L = 0)$ | 0.02 | 0.78 | 0.34 | 0.26 | 0.13 | | | | |
| Positive Equity $(I^L = 1)$ | 0.98 | 0.94 | 0.41 | 0.50 | 0.23 | | | | |
| Bottom 3rd | 0.32 | 0.65 | 0.30 | 0.60 | 0.23 | | | | |
| Middle 3rd | 0.32 | 0.75 | 0.51 | 0.44 | 0.26 | | | | |
| Top 3rd | 0.32 | 1.48 | 0.49 | 0.36 | 0.16 | | | | |

 $^{^{\}ast}$ All tabulations are weighted, using PSID family weights. Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$.

Model Specifications

"Quasi-Reduced Form":

$$Debt_{nht_{24,j}} = \beta_{nh0} + \beta_{nh1} \Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} + \beta_{nh2} \Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot EduFin1_{imt_{18,j}} + \beta_{nh3} \Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot EduFin2_{imt_{18,j}} \beta_{nh4} \Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}} + \beta_{nh5} \Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot EduFin1_{imt_{18,j}} + \beta_{nh6} \Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot EduFin2_{imt_{18,j}} + \beta_{nh6} X_{nt_{24,j}} + \beta_{nh7} Z_{mt_{24,j}} + \phi_{t_{24,j}}^{D} + \delta_{nmt_{24,j}}^{D} + u_{nht_{24,j}}^{D}.$$
 (9)

for n=i (parent), j (child) and h=MortBal, OthDebt, where $X_{nt_{24,j}}$ are parent i's (n=i) & child j's characteristics at child age 24 and $Z_{mt_{24,j}}$ are the corresponding characteristics for location m.

$$Cons_{nft_{24,j}} = \alpha_{nh0} + \alpha_{nh1} \Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} + \alpha_{nh2} \Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot EduFin1_{imt_{18,j}}$$

$$+ \alpha_{nh3} \Delta H_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot EduFin2_{imt_{18,j}}$$

$$\alpha_{nh4} \Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}} + \alpha_{nh5} \Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot EduFin1_{imt_{18,j}}$$

$$+ \alpha_{nh6} \Delta Y_{ijmt_{18,j}} \cdot EduFin2_{imt_{18,j}}$$

$$+ \alpha_{nh6} X_{nt_{24,j}} + \alpha_{nh7} Z_{mt_{24,j}} + \phi_{t_{24,j}}^{C} + \delta_{nmt_{24,j}}^{C} + u_{nft_{24,j}}^{C}.$$

$$(10)$$

Model Specifications

Effects of College & Financing Choices:

$$Debt_{nht_{24,j}} = \beta_{nh0}^* + \beta_{nh1}^* EduFin1_{imt_{18,j}} + \beta_{nh2}^* EduFin2_{imt_{18,j}} + \beta_{nh3}^* X_{nt_{24,j}} + \beta_{nh4}^* Z_{mt_{24,j}} + \phi_{t_{24,j}}^D + \delta_{nmt_{24,j}}^D + u_{nht_{24,j}}^D.$$
(11)

for n = i (parent), j (child) and h = MortBal, OthDebt, and

$$Cons_{nft_{24,j}} = \alpha_{nh0}^* + \alpha_{nh1}^* EduFin1_{imt_{18,j}} + \alpha_{nh2}^* EduFin2_{imt_{18,j}} + \alpha_{nh3}^* X_{nt_{24,j}} + \alpha_{nh4}^* Z_{mt_{24,j}} + \phi_{t_{24,j}}^C + \delta_{nmt_{24,j}}^C + u_{nft_{24,j}}^C.$$
(12)

for f = FoodHome, FoodOut.

Model Specifications

Effects of College Attendance & CollTrans:

Let $Attend_{jmt_{18,j}}$ denote indicator for whether child j attends college at or after age 18.

$$Debt_{nht_{24,j}} = \beta_{nh0}^{\dagger} + \beta_{nh1}^{\dagger} Attend_{jmt_{18,j}} + \beta_{nh2}^{\dagger} ColTran_{ijmt_{18,j}} + \beta_{nh6}^{\dagger} X_{nt_{24,j}} + \beta_{nh7}^{\dagger} Z_{mt_{24,j}} + \phi_{t_{24,j}}^{D} + \delta_{nmt_{24,j}}^{D} + u_{nht_{24,j}}^{D}.$$
(13)

for n = i (parent), j (child) and h = MortBal, OthDebt, and

$$Cons_{nft_{24,j}} = \alpha_{nh0}^{\dagger} + \alpha_{nh1}^{\dagger} Attend_{jmt_{18,j}} + \alpha_{nh2}^{\dagger} ColTran_{ijmt_{18,j}}$$

$$+ \alpha_{nh6}^{\dagger} X_{nt_{24,j}} + \alpha_{nh7}^{\dagger} Z_{mt_{24,j}} + \phi_{t_{24,j}}^{C} + \delta_{nmt_{24,j}}^{C} + u_{nft_{24,j}}^{C}.$$

$$(14)$$

for f = FoodHome, FoodOut.

Table 10: Effects of College Attendance, Financing and Changes in Parental Housing Wealth & Income on *Parents' & Child's Indebtedness at Child Age 25**

| Variables All as | Parents' | Child's | | | | |
|---|-------------------|------------|--|--|--|--|
| of Child Age $= 18$ | Housing Debt | Other Debt | | | | |
| "Quasi" Reduced For | m Estimates: | | | | | |
| ΔH_{ij} | 0.394** | -0.016 | | | | |
| ΔY_{ij} | 0.180 | -0.045 | | | | |
| $\Delta H_{ij} 	imes 	extit{EduFin0}_{ij}$ | 0.258 | -0.086*** | | | | |
| $\Delta H_{ij} 	imes 	extit{EduFin} 1_{ij}$ | 0.278* | 0.003 | | | | |
| $\Delta H_{ij} 	imes 	extit{EduFin} 2_{ij}$ | 0.472** | -0.006 | | | | |
| $\Delta Y_{ij} 	imes 	extit{EduFin} 0_{ij}$ | -0.310 | -0.218 | | | | |
| $\Delta Y_{ij} 	imes 	extit{EduFin} 1_{ij}$ | 0.024 | -0.010 | | | | |
| $\Delta Y_{ij} 	imes 	extit{EduFin2}_{ij}$ | 0.300 | -0.055 | | | | |
| Effects of College & I | inancing Choices: | | | | | |
| $EduFin1_{ij}$ | 0.091 | 0.873*** | | | | |
| EduFin2 _{ij} | 2.134*** | 0.855*** | | | | |
| Effects of College Attendance & CollTrans: | | | | | | |
| Child Attends College | 0.472** | 0.864*** | | | | |
| CollTrans _{ij} | 0.512** | -0.020 | | | | |
| | | | | | | |

^{*} Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$.

Table 11: Effects of College Attendance, Financing and Changes in Parental Housing Wealth & Income on Parents' & Child's Annual Food Consumption at Child Age 25*

| Par | Child's | | | | | |
|--|--|----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Eating | Eating | Eating | Eating | | | |
| at Home | Out | at Home | Out | | | |
| "Quasi" Reduced Form Estimates: | | | | | | |
| 0.023 | -0.000 | -0.002 | 0.005** | | | |
| -0.090 | 0.165 | 0.005 | 0.000 | | | |
| 0.004 | 0.010 | -0.003 | 0.002 | | | |
| -0.007 | 0.009 | -0.003 | 0.004 | | | |
| 0.050 | 0.007 | -0.001 | 0.007** | | | |
| -0.049 | 0.073 | 0.024* | -0.035*** | | | |
| -0.006 | 0.407 | 0.006 | 0.012 | | | |
| -0.197 | 0.012 | -0.003 | -0.003 | | | |
| inancing Choices | | | | | | |
| -0.028 | 0.078** | 0.009 | 0.045** | | | |
| 0.015 | -0.052 | -0.030 | 0.067** | | | |
| Effects of College Attendance & CollTrans: | | | | | | |
| -0.057 | 0.044* | -0.019 | 0.041** | | | |
| 0.107 | -0.014 | -0.000 | 0.008* | | | |
| | Eating at Home n Estimates: 0.023 -0.090 0.004 -0.007 0.050 -0.049 -0.006 -0.197 Financing Choices -0.028 0.015 endance & CollTr -0.057 | at Home Out m Estimates: 0.023 | Eating at Home Eating Out Eating at Home n Estimates: -0.002 -0.002 -0.090 0.165 0.005 0.004 0.010 -0.003 -0.007 0.009 -0.003 0.050 0.007 -0.001 -0.049 0.073 0.024* -0.097 0.012 -0.006 -0.197 0.012 -0.003 Financing Choices: -0.028 0.078** 0.009 0.015 -0.052 -0.030 endance & CollTrans: -0.057 0.044* -0.019 | | | |

^{*} Dollar amounts are in 10K of 2013\$.

Parents' & Child's Indebtedness

Findings on effects of college financing on indebtedness

- Parents who provide transfers for college have higher levels of housing debt when their children are 24 years old.
 - A\$10,000 increase in housing wealth when children are 18 is correlated with a \$3,940 increase in parental housing debt when children are 24.
 - Correlation is largest for parents who provided transfers for college though differences between groups are not statistically significant.
 - Parents who provide transfers have \$21,340 more in housing debt when their children are 24.
 - Each additional dollar of transfers is correlated with \$0.51 in additional mortgage debt later.
- Children who go to college have more debt at age 24, though there
 are no differences between children whose parents provide transfers
 and those who do not.

Parents' & Child's Consumption

Findings on effects of college financing on consumption

- Few consistent patterns in either parental or child consumption.
- Parents who provide transfers consume more food at home and less food away from home but differences are not statistically significant.
- Results suggest we may have not controlled sufficiently for current economic circumstances of parents and children.

Next Steps

More on relationship between transfers & parental and child Debt

- We find parental debt increases with transfers but child debt does not decrease.
- Are parents' & children's debt-financing of latter's college substitutes or complements?
- Do children go to higher quality (and more expensive schools)?
- Are results robust to including children who have not formed their own household?

• More on consequences of financing for well-being of parents

- Are there effects of financing on consumption for parents later in life?
- Does the debt financing of college by parents affect parents' retirement?

Next Steps

- More on consequences of college financing on well-being of adult children
 - Are our findings of little effect of college financing affecting adult child really true?
 - Need to look more closely at whether college financing affected life-cyle events like first home purchase, age of first marriage, etc.

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